Summary
This Online Appendix contains a series of mathematical derivations and results supplementing the material in the main body of, and the Appendix to, the paper. The presented material is organized as follows. Section 2 explores our set-up under full information. Section 3 relaxes the assumption that the mean of θ i 's is zero.
The main conclusions based on the analysis presented herein are: First, the comparison of group welfare under different scenariosthe central aim of our paperis in the most general case algebraically untractable under both the full information case and when relaxing the assumption that the mean of θ i 's is zero. In these cases, the comparison of group welfare under different scenarios is tractable only under strong assumptions regarding the extent of the group's homogeneity.
Second, the scenario when the planner mandates behavior (but not behavioral conformity) is mathematically similar under both the full information case and the incomplete information scenario in that fully characterizing the problem's solution for the most general case is analytically untractable. We do, however, state a set of sufficient conditions under which we can analytically fully characterize the solution to the planner's problem of mandating behavior (but not behavioral conformity); under those conditions, the solution to the planner's problem of mandating behavior (but not behavioral conformity) in the incomplete information case coincides with the solution to the planner's problem of mandating behavioral conformity.
Full Information
Key assumption:θ 1 ,…,θ n are common knowledge.
Two definitions, which we use in analysis below: 
Non-Cooperative Equilibrium (N)
Individuals play a static game with full information. The equilibrium concept is Nash equilibrium. To find reaction function of individual i, we maximize U i (expression (1) in the paper) choosing a i , which implies the following first-order condition:
After re-arranging terms in (S1), we obtain
The system of equations (S2) for i=1,…,n has a unique solution (a 1 N ,…,a n N ) because the matrix of coefficients is a dominant diagonal matrix, and hence non-singular. (The matrix of coefficients is identical to the one featured in expression (A5) of the paper.) Thus, under full information, we have a unique Nash equilibrium in the non-cooperative scenario. From (S2), however, it is clear that (a 1 N ,…,a n N ) depends in a complicated way on λ i 's and θ i 's, which, as we demonstrate below (see Section 2.4), unfortunately renders welfare analysis in the general case untractable.
Under 'limited homogeneity' the system (S2) for i=1,…,n becomes
Adding up equations (S3) for i=1,…,n and simplifying we obtain (S4) . 
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Under 'full homogeneity', we thus obtain (using (S6)) a i N =θ.
Mandating Behavioral Conformity (MBC)
The social planner, knowing all ω i 's, λ i 's, and θ i 's, chooses the group-wide common action a to 
Mandating Behavior (but not Behavioral Conformity) (MB)
We define 'mandating behavior' as scenario where the social planner, knowing all ω i 's, λ i 's, and θ i 's, chooses a vector of actions (a 1 ,…,a n ) to maximize group welfare
where U i is defined in expression (1) in the paper. Note that this is the first-best solution from group welfare point of view. Having an understanding of the algebra of this problem, however, is instructive for our analysis in Section 3 of this Online Appendix.
The first-order conditions for 'mandating behavior' are:
Plugging (S9) and (S10) into (S8) gives
which, after simplifying, yields:
We can re-write the last part of LHS of (S12) as
. ( 1) ( 1)
Multiplying (S12) by (−1) and using (S13) then gives
To ease the exposition, let's define:
so that (S14) can be written as (S17) . We would like to characterize the solution to the system (S17) for i=1,…,n. In particular,
we would like to know if the solution exists, and, if it exists, whether it is unique. To do so, we would like to verify or refute non-singularity of the matrix of coefficients of system (S17) for i=1,…,n. Let us call this matrix B=[b ij ] n×n . To check non-singularity of B, we try to verify if the matrix of coefficients is dominant diagonal, which is true if ii
As it turns out, the matrix B is not dominant diagonal for all possible parameter values.
To see this, take the example of n=3, λ 1 =λ 2 =0.9, λ 3 =0. As a result, we characterize the solution to the system (S17) for i=1,…,n by finding sufficient conditions such that matrix B is dominant diagonal and, hence, non-singular. In particular, we have the following result:
Result: The matrix of the coefficients of the system defined by (S17) for i=1,…,n is dominant diagonal, and, hence, non-singular, if b ij <0 for all i and j≠i, which in turn holds if λ i =λ j and ω i =ω j for all i,j.
Proof: To prove this Result, suppose that b ij , defined in (S16), is negative for all i and j≠i. Then,
which is smaller than |b ii |=b ii defined in (S15). Hence, the resulting matrix of coefficients of the system defined by (S17) for i=1,…,n is dominant diagonal, therefore non-singular, and, thus, the solution to the system defined by (S17) for i=1,…,n, which we denote as (a 1 MB ,…,a n MB ), is are close to 1 and all other λ's are close to 0 (that is, the social group can be describe as heterogeneous with respect to the strength of members' innate conformist tendencies), then, from (S16), b ij >0. Second, when it is unique, the closed-form solution to the problem of 'mandating behavior' is evidently algebraically very messy.
In contrast, we are able to obtain more tractable closed-form solutions to the problem of 'mandating behavior' using Definitions 1 and 2. Under 'limited homogeneity', (S14) becomes
Summing up expressions (S19) for i=1,…,n, we obtain (S20) . ( 1) (1 ) 2
From (S22), it follows that under 'full homogeneity' a i MB =θ.
Welfare Analysis
We know that 'mandating behavior' coincides with the first-best solution from the group welfare point of view. It is therefore sensible only to attempt to compare group welfare under 'mandating behavioral conformity' and under the non-cooperative equilibrium. From (S2), it is clear that (a 1 N ,…,a n N ) depends in a complicated way on λ i 's and θ i 's. As a result, the comparison of group welfare under the non-cooperative scenario with that under mandated behavioral conformity is in general algebraically untractable.
In fact, the algebra of group welfare comparison under the two scenarios is untractable even under 'limited homogeneity', in which case group welfare under mandated behavioral conformity equals (see (S7) (1 )( 1) 1
Evidently, comparison of (S23) and (S24) 
Relaxing the assumption Eθ i =0 for all i
Key assumption: Eθ i =µ i .
We introduce another two definitions, which we use in the analysis below: 
Non-Cooperative Equilibrium (N)
Group members play a Bayesian-Nash game. To find the non-cooperative equilibrium, follow the steps outlined in Proof of Lemma in the Appendix of the paper. Under the assumption that
Upon comparison of (S25) with (A4), it is clear that they differ only in terms of the RHS. Thus, the matrix of the coefficients implied by system (S25) for i=1,…,n is dominant diagonal and, thus, non-singular. Therefore, there exists a unique vector (Ea 1 * (θ 1 ),…,Ea n * (θ n )), which solves the system (S25) for i=1,…,n and depends in a complicated way on λ i 's and µ i 's. As a result, a i N , as implied by (A3), no longer equals λ i θ i , but rather equals
an expression containing {λ j } j≠i and µ i 's. In contrast, under 'full ex-ante homogeneity', (S27) simplifies to
Observe that the system (S28) for i=1,…,n is algebraically identical to the system (S3) for i=1,…,n if in (S3) we replace a i with Ea i (θ i ), a j with Ea j (θ j ), and θ i with µ. Hence, using steps analogous to (S4)-(S6), it follows that Ea i (θ i )=µ and, using (S26), we are able to obtain a tractable closed-form solution for a i N equal to
Mandating Behavioral Conformity (MBC)
The group planner chooses a to maximize 
Mandating Behavior (but not Behavioral Conformity) (MB)
The social planner, knowing all ω i 's and λ i 's, but not knowing exact realizations of θ i 's, chooses a vector of actions (a 1 ,…,a n ) to maximize expected group welfare E E ,
where U i is defined in expression (1) in the paper. The first-order conditions are E 0
Using the same steps as in Section 2.3 of this Online Appendix and taking expectation, we obtain:
Observe that equation (S31) is algebraically identical to equation (S11) if in (S11) we replace θ i by µ i . Therefore, the analysis of the system of equations (S31) for i=1,…,n is algebraically identical to that of the system (S11) for i=1,…,n. We can therefore immediately state the crucial expression, which is an algebraic equivalent of expression (S14) with θ i replaced by µ i :
From the analysis in Section 2.3 in this Online Appendix, we know that if
for all i and j≠i, then the matrix of coefficients of the system (S32) for i=1,…,n is dominant diagonal and hence non-singular, and the system has a uniquealbeit algebraically messysolution. Note in particular that if µ i =0 for all i, as assumed in the paper, and (S33) holds, then the unique solution is a i =0 for all i, that is, mandating behavior (but not conformity) implies 'mandating behavioral conformity'.
Note that the system (S32) for i=1,…,n is not much simpler even if we assume 'limited ex-ante homogeneity' when µ≠0 (in the sense that it does not allow for tractable closed-form solution). On the other hand, 'full ex-ante homogeneity' implies, using analogous steps as those in Section 2.3 of this Online Appendix, that a i MB =µ.
Welfare Analysis
Given analysis in Sections 3.1-3.3 of this Online Appendix, it is clear that while the model can still be solved when relaxing the assumption Eθ i =0 for all i, the welfare analysisthe central aim of this paperbecomes untractable. Algebraically, the reason is that in the most general case, assuming either Eθ i =µ i or Eθ i =µ results in a non-cooperative equilibrium action, which depends on λ i 's and µ i 's (or µ) and a similarly untractable closed-form solution in the cases of 'mandating behavior' (but not behavioral conformity) and 'mandating behavioral conformity'.
Welfare analysis is in fact untractable even if we assume 'limited ex-ante homogeneity'
(Definition 3). In contrast, 'full ex-ante homogeneity' does allow for tractability. Mandating
